Our recent paper entitled “A Survey on Attack Vectors in Stack Cache Memory” has been accepted for publication by the VLSI Journal Integration.

Abstract:

Over the past few decades, various ways have been conducted through side-channel attacks to steal information for a computer system. Unlike conventional hardware-based methods i.e. power-based side channel, side channel on micro-architecture does not require any physical access to the devices under interest. Instead, only compromised programs need to be co-located on the same machine as the victim. For some other scenarios, malicious users can form side-channel information leveraging the timing of program execution. In this survey, we are presenting a comprehensive taxonomy of attack vectors in stack cache memory modules, which mostly are the points of attack by side channel. Due to the significance of side-channel attacks, the challenges and overheads of these attack vectors are described through the course of this study. We discuss what side-channel attacks are, how they are used, and how they can be prevented through the use of obfuscation techniques. To accomplish this, we introduce the findings of a number of relevant works. These include successful attacks on systems using novel variations of side-channel attacks and preventative measures against the attacks.

Citation: 

N. Khoshavi, M. Maghsoudloo, Y. bi, W. Francois, L. Jaimes, A. Sargolzaei, “A Survey on Attack Vectors in Stack Cache Memory”, the VLSI Journal Integration, 2020.