Our paper entitled “Resilient Frequency Control Design for Microgrids Under False Data Injection” has been accepted for publication by IEEE Transaction on Industrial Electronics.
The increased integration of cyber and communication networks in microgrids for obtaining measurements and relaying controls results in a Cyber-Physical Microgrid (CPM) that paves the way for many essential applications. One of these applications is the Load Frequency Control (LFC), which is more challenging due to the stochastic behavior of renewable generation. The CPM also facilitates the participation of Electric Vehicle (EV) batteries in LFC. These information and communication technologies provide a myriad of advantages but also lead to a close synergy between heterogeneous physical and cyber components unlocking access points for cyber intrusions. A cyber intrusion camouflages and may present itself as uncertainty, eventually leading to astray controls and remedial actions. This leads to a need for an observer-based control strategy that can observe stochastic dynamic encumbrances and remunerate for them through a two-layer controller. The proposed controller is also investigated for its efficacy through Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) simulations in OPAL-RT that integrates the fidelity of physical simulations with the flexibility of numerical simulations.
M. Khalghani, J. Solanki, S. Solanki, M. Khooban, A. Sargolzaei, “Resilient Frequency Control Design for Microgrids Under False Data Injection”, IEEE Transaction on Industrial Electronics, 2020.